A Comprehensive List of Cryptocurrency Exchange Hacks ...

Bob The Magic Custodian



Summary: Everyone knows that when you give your assets to someone else, they always keep them safe. If this is true for individuals, it is certainly true for businesses.
Custodians always tell the truth and manage funds properly. They won't have any interest in taking the assets as an exchange operator would. Auditors tell the truth and can't be misled. That's because organizations that are regulated are incapable of lying and don't make mistakes.

First, some background. Here is a summary of how custodians make us more secure:

Previously, we might give Alice our crypto assets to hold. There were risks:

But "no worries", Alice has a custodian named Bob. Bob is dressed in a nice suit. He knows some politicians. And he drives a Porsche. "So you have nothing to worry about!". And look at all the benefits we get:
See - all problems are solved! All we have to worry about now is:
It's pretty simple. Before we had to trust Alice. Now we only have to trust Alice, Bob, and all the ways in which they communicate. Just think of how much more secure we are!

"On top of that", Bob assures us, "we're using a special wallet structure". Bob shows Alice a diagram. "We've broken the balance up and store it in lots of smaller wallets. That way", he assures her, "a thief can't take it all at once". And he points to a historic case where a large sum was taken "because it was stored in a single wallet... how stupid".
"Very early on, we used to have all the crypto in one wallet", he said, "and then one Christmas a hacker came and took it all. We call him the Grinch. Now we individually wrap each crypto and stick it under a binary search tree. The Grinch has never been back since."

"As well", Bob continues, "even if someone were to get in, we've got insurance. It covers all thefts and even coercion, collusion, and misplaced keys - only subject to the policy terms and conditions." And with that, he pulls out a phone-book sized contract and slams it on the desk with a thud. "Yep", he continues, "we're paying top dollar for one of the best policies in the country!"
"Can I read it?' Alice asks. "Sure," Bob says, "just as soon as our legal team is done with it. They're almost through the first chapter." He pauses, then continues. "And can you believe that sales guy Mike? He has the same year Porsche as me. I mean, what are the odds?"

"Do you use multi-sig?", Alice asks. "Absolutely!" Bob replies. "All our engineers are fully trained in multi-sig. Whenever we want to set up a new wallet, we generate 2 separate keys in an air-gapped process and store them in this proprietary system here. Look, it even requires the biometric signature from one of our team members to initiate any withdrawal." He demonstrates by pressing his thumb into the display. "We use a third-party cloud validation API to match the thumbprint and authorize each withdrawal. The keys are also backed up daily to an off-site third-party."
"Wow that's really impressive," Alice says, "but what if we need access for a withdrawal outside of office hours?" "Well that's no issue", Bob says, "just send us an email, call, or text message and we always have someone on staff to help out. Just another part of our strong commitment to all our customers!"

"What about Proof of Reserve?", Alice asks. "Of course", Bob replies, "though rather than publish any blockchain addresses or signed transaction, for privacy we just do a SHA256 refactoring of the inverse hash modulus for each UTXO nonce and combine the smart contract coefficient consensus in our hyperledger lightning node. But it's really simple to use." He pushes a button and a large green checkmark appears on a screen. "See - the algorithm ran through and reserves are proven."
"Wow", Alice says, "you really know your stuff! And that is easy to use! What about fiat balances?" "Yeah, we have an auditor too", Bob replies, "Been using him for a long time so we have quite a strong relationship going! We have special books we give him every year and he's very efficient! Checks the fiat, crypto, and everything all at once!"

"We used to have a nice offline multi-sig setup we've been using without issue for the past 5 years, but I think we'll move all our funds over to your facility," Alice says. "Awesome", Bob replies, "Thanks so much! This is perfect timing too - my Porsche got a dent on it this morning. We have the paperwork right over here." "Great!", Alice replies.
And with that, Alice gets out her pen and Bob gets the contract. "Don't worry", he says, "you can take your crypto-assets back anytime you like - just subject to our cancellation policy. Our annual management fees are also super low and we don't adjust them often".

How many holes have to exist for your funds to get stolen?
Just one.

Why are we taking a powerful offline multi-sig setup, widely used globally in hundreds of different/lacking regulatory environments with 0 breaches to date, and circumventing it by a demonstrably weak third party layer? And paying a great expense to do so?
If you go through the list of breaches in the past 2 years to highly credible organizations, you go through the list of major corporate frauds (only the ones we know about), you go through the list of all the times platforms have lost funds, you go through the list of times and ways that people have lost their crypto from identity theft, hot wallet exploits, extortion, etc... and then you go through this custodian with a fine-tooth comb and truly believe they have value to add far beyond what you could, sticking your funds in a wallet (or set of wallets) they control exclusively is the absolute worst possible way to take advantage of that security.

The best way to add security for crypto-assets is to make a stronger multi-sig. With one custodian, what you are doing is giving them your cryptocurrency and hoping they're honest, competent, and flawlessly secure. It's no different than storing it on a really secure exchange. Maybe the insurance will cover you. Didn't work for Bitpay in 2015. Didn't work for Yapizon in 2017. Insurance has never paid a claim in the entire history of cryptocurrency. But maybe you'll get lucky. Maybe your exact scenario will buck the trend and be what they're willing to cover. After the large deductible and hopefully without a long and expensive court battle.

And you want to advertise this increase in risk, the lapse of judgement, an accident waiting to happen, as though it's some kind of benefit to customers ("Free institutional-grade storage for your digital assets.")? And then some people are writing to the OSC that custodians should be mandatory for all funds on every exchange platform? That this somehow will make Canadians as a whole more secure or better protected compared with standard air-gapped multi-sig? On what planet?

Most of the problems in Canada stemmed from one thing - a lack of transparency. If Canadians had known what a joke Quadriga was - it wouldn't have grown to lose $400m from hard-working Canadians from coast to coast to coast. And Gerald Cotten would be in jail, not wherever he is now (at best, rotting peacefully). EZ-BTC and mister Dave Smilie would have been a tiny little scam to his friends, not a multi-million dollar fraud. Einstein would have got their act together or been shut down BEFORE losing millions and millions more in people's funds generously donated to criminals. MapleChange wouldn't have even been a thing. And maybe we'd know a little more about CoinTradeNewNote - like how much was lost in there. Almost all of the major losses with cryptocurrency exchanges involve deception with unbacked funds.
So it's great to see transparency reports from BitBuy and ShakePay where someone independently verified the backing. The only thing we don't have is:
It's not complicated to validate cryptocurrency assets. They need to exist, they need to be spendable, and they need to cover the total balances. There are plenty of credible people and firms across the country that have the capacity to reasonably perform this validation. Having more frequent checks by different, independent, parties who publish transparent reports is far more valuable than an annual check by a single "more credible/official" party who does the exact same basic checks and may or may not publish anything. Here's an example set of requirements that could be mandated:
There are ways to structure audits such that neither crypto assets nor customer information are ever put at risk, and both can still be properly validated and publicly verifiable. There are also ways to structure audits such that they are completely reasonable for small platforms and don't inhibit innovation in any way. By making the process as reasonable as possible, we can completely eliminate any reason/excuse that an honest platform would have for not being audited. That is arguable far more important than any incremental improvement we might get from mandating "the best of the best" accountants. Right now we have nothing mandated and tons of Canadians using offshore exchanges with no oversight whatsoever.

Transparency does not prove crypto assets are safe. CoinTradeNewNote, Flexcoin ($600k), and Canadian Bitcoins ($100k) are examples where crypto-assets were breached from platforms in Canada. All of them were online wallets and used no multi-sig as far as any records show. This is consistent with what we see globally - air-gapped multi-sig wallets have an impeccable record, while other schemes tend to suffer breach after breach. We don't actually know how much CoinTrader lost because there was no visibility. Rather than publishing details of what happened, the co-founder of CoinTrader silently moved on to found another platform - the "most trusted way to buy and sell crypto" - a site that has no information whatsoever (that I could find) on the storage practices and a FAQ advising that “[t]rading cryptocurrency is completely safe” and that having your own wallet is “entirely up to you! You can certainly keep cryptocurrency, or fiat, or both, on the app.” Doesn't sound like much was learned here, which is really sad to see.
It's not that complicated or unreasonable to set up a proper hardware wallet. Multi-sig can be learned in a single course. Something the equivalent complexity of a driver's license test could prevent all the cold storage exploits we've seen to date - even globally. Platform operators have a key advantage in detecting and preventing fraud - they know their customers far better than any custodian ever would. The best job that custodians can do is to find high integrity individuals and train them to form even better wallet signatories. Rather than mandating that all platforms expose themselves to arbitrary third party risks, regulations should center around ensuring that all signatories are background-checked, properly trained, and using proper procedures. We also need to make sure that signatories are empowered with rights and responsibilities to reject and report fraud. They need to know that they can safely challenge and delay a transaction - even if it turns out they made a mistake. We need to have an environment where mistakes are brought to the surface and dealt with. Not one where firms and people feel the need to hide what happened. In addition to a knowledge-based test, an auditor can privately interview each signatory to make sure they're not in coercive situations, and we should make sure they can freely and anonymously report any issues without threat of retaliation.
A proper multi-sig has each signature held by a separate person and is governed by policies and mutual decisions instead of a hierarchy. It includes at least one redundant signature. For best results, 3of4, 3of5, 3of6, 4of5, 4of6, 4of7, 5of6, or 5of7.

History has demonstrated over and over again the risk of hot wallets even to highly credible organizations. Nonetheless, many platforms have hot wallets for convenience. While such losses are generally compensated by platforms without issue (for example Poloniex, Bitstamp, Bitfinex, Gatecoin, Coincheck, Bithumb, Zaif, CoinBene, Binance, Bitrue, Bitpoint, Upbit, VinDAX, and now KuCoin), the public tends to focus more on cases that didn't end well. Regardless of what systems are employed, there is always some level of risk. For that reason, most members of the public would prefer to see third party insurance.
Rather than trying to convince third party profit-seekers to provide comprehensive insurance and then relying on an expensive and slow legal system to enforce against whatever legal loopholes they manage to find each and every time something goes wrong, insurance could be run through multiple exchange operators and regulators, with the shared interest of having a reputable industry, keeping costs down, and taking care of Canadians. For example, a 4 of 7 multi-sig insurance fund held between 5 independent exchange operators and 2 regulatory bodies. All Canadian exchanges could pay premiums at a set rate based on their needed coverage, with a higher price paid for hot wallet coverage (anything not an air-gapped multi-sig cold wallet). Such a model would be much cheaper to manage, offer better coverage, and be much more reliable to payout when needed. The kind of coverage you could have under this model is unheard of. You could even create something like the CDIC to protect Canadians who get their trading accounts hacked if they can sufficiently prove the loss is legitimate. In cases of fraud, gross negligence, or insolvency, the fund can be used to pay affected users directly (utilizing the last transparent balance report in the worst case), something which private insurance would never touch. While it's recommended to have official policies for coverage, a model where members vote would fully cover edge cases. (Could be similar to the Supreme Court where justices vote based on case law.)
Such a model could fully protect all Canadians across all platforms. You can have a fiat coverage governed by legal agreements, and crypto-asset coverage governed by both multi-sig and legal agreements. It could be practical, affordable, and inclusive.

Now, we are at a crossroads. We can happily give up our freedom, our innovation, and our money. We can pay hefty expenses to auditors, lawyers, and regulators year after year (and make no mistake - this cost will grow to many millions or even billions as the industry grows - and it will be borne by all Canadians on every platform because platforms are not going to eat up these costs at a loss). We can make it nearly impossible for any new platform to enter the marketplace, forcing Canadians to use the same stagnant platforms year after year. We can centralize and consolidate the entire industry into 2 or 3 big players and have everyone else fail (possibly to heavy losses of users of those platforms). And when a flawed security model doesn't work and gets breached, we can make it even more complicated with even more people in suits making big money doing the job that blockchain was supposed to do in the first place. We can build a system which is so intertwined and dependent on big government, traditional finance, and central bankers that it's future depends entirely on that of the fiat system, of fractional banking, and of government bail-outs. If we choose this path, as history has shown us over and over again, we can not go back, save for revolution. Our children and grandchildren will still be paying the consequences of what we decided today.
Or, we can find solutions that work. We can maintain an open and innovative environment while making the adjustments we need to make to fully protect Canadian investors and cryptocurrency users, giving easy and affordable access to cryptocurrency for all Canadians on the platform of their choice, and creating an environment in which entrepreneurs and problem solvers can bring those solutions forward easily. None of the above precludes innovation in any way, or adds any unreasonable cost - and these three policies would demonstrably eliminate or resolve all 109 historic cases as studied here - that's every single case researched so far going back to 2011. It includes every loss that was studied so far not just in Canada but globally as well.
Unfortunately, finding answers is the least challenging part. Far more challenging is to get platform operators and regulators to agree on anything. My last post got no response whatsoever, and while the OSC has told me they're happy for industry feedback, I believe my opinion alone is fairly meaningless. This takes the whole community working together to solve. So please let me know your thoughts. Please take the time to upvote and share this with people. Please - let's get this solved and not leave it up to other people to do.

Facts/background/sources (skip if you like):



Thoughts?
submitted by azoundria2 to QuadrigaInitiative [link] [comments]

Is PrimeXBT Safe for Canadian Traders?

Is PrimeXBT Safe for Canadian Traders?
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With the dramatic increase in the number of traders and investors in Canada that are using PrimeXBT, one question has been asked recently more than others which is whether PrimeXBT is safe for Canadian traders.
The number of Canadian users at PrimeXBT has been growing rapidly throughout 2020 as a sign that the tools and features on the platform are opening up new opportunities for interacting in the market in more optimal ways.
This guide covers whether or not PrimeXBT is safe for Canadian traders, and looks at some of the features and tools of the platform.
The Canadian Market in 2020
Like much of the rest of the world, the Canadian market has seen some of the highest levels of all volatility in 2020 that have been seen in many years, or even at all throughout the history of cryptocurrency.
The Canadian market has seen renewed growth following the contractions throughout 2018 and much of 2019 when the global bear market in the cryptocurrency space drove many retail investors back out of the market after the exponential growth of 2017.
This has led many Canadian traders to wonder whether we are on the brink of another major bull run as was seen both in 2017 as well as 2013, and that would potentially see the price of Bitcoin driven up to the range of $50,000 or more.
The Exponential Growth of PrimeXBT
With the backdrop of the excitement within the global cryptocurrency market in general, and the Canadian cryptocurrency market more specifically, PrimeXBT has been perfectly positioned for exponential growth since its launch in early 2018.
The platform initially launched at the start of 2018 with a waiting list of more than 150,000 traders, and this showed the interest in the platform that was present even before it came onto the market.
As a result of the unique tools and features provided by PrimeXBT, it has grown exponentially over the past few years to become the world’s leading multi-asset margin trading platform and today managing up to $2 billion worth of global trade every day.
What is PrimeXBT?

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PrimeXBT is a margin trading-centric platform that provides high leverage trading on a wide range of cryptoassets as well as many of the world’s leading traditional assets.
Traders at PrimeXBT are able to access up to 100X leverage on a wide range of cryptoassets that include BTC, ETH, XRP, LTC, and EOS.
This is whilst also being able to access up to 500X leverage on a range of traditional assets like stock indices such as the S&P500 and FTSE100, forex pairs such as USD/EUR and AUD/CAD, and commodities such as gold and oil.
PrimeXBT: Security Features
From a security perspective, PrimeXBT is one of the leading trading platforms in the crypto market, and has built a strong reputation for being a safe and reliable platform to trade on.
Much of this is as a result of the bank-grade security features that are implemented throughout PrimeXBT that include mandatory Bitcoin address whitelisting and hardware security modules with rating of FIPS PUB 140-2 Level 3 or higher.
By working to add advanced security solutions throughout its platform, PrimeXBT has shown a strong commitment to protecting the funds and data of its users.
PrimeXBT: Security Track Record
While there are many other platforms in the cryptocurrency space that have suffered devastating hacks over the past 2 or 3 years, PrimeXBT is one of a small number of top tier platforms that have remained hack-free throughout this period.
A good example of this is the Binance hack in 2019 that saw the platform lose more than $40 million of its users’ funds, and more recently the KuCoin hack where more than $150 million was lost by that platform.
In contrast, PrimeXBT has never been hacked and has never been breached by hackers and as such remains as one of the most trusted platforms in the market, having a clean security track record.
PrimeXBT: Excellent Customer Support
In 2019, a study of the top 5 crypto margin trading platforms found that PrimeXBT has the best customer service of all 5, and also was the only platform out of the 5 to have full marks for all for metrics.
These metrics were politeness, responsiveness, helpfulness, and the range of different communication channels that were available to users.
By having an excellent customer support structure, PrimeXBT has ensured that its users are able to get fast and easy solutions to the problems and that there is always a direct line of communication open with the admin at the platform to be able to effectively deal with any issues that arise.
Other Advantages of Using PrimeXBT
PrimeXBT also provides a number of other advantages that are unique to the platform including providing the lowest fee schedule of any major cryptocurrency trading platform in the market with a low flat rate of 0.05% applied to all trades, irrespective of the size of a trade or the asset being traded.
As well as this, PrimeXBT’s users can enjoy a robust trading engine that is built into the core of the PrimeXBT platform and that can execute up to 12,000 trades per second with an average trade time of less than 7.02 ms.
PrimeXBT also has a unique 4-tier referral program where the traders can generate revenue streams from direct referrals, as well as indirect referrals up to 4 levels deep, with this dramatically increasing the profitability of affiliate activities, and netting the top 3 affiliates on the platform more than $1 million in 2019.
In Summary
PrimeXBT is a safe and well-reputed trading platform for Canadian traders and this is the reason for its exponential growth of users and volume within Canada over the past months.
As well as being a safe platform to trade at, PrimeXBT also provides a range of unique tools and features to use in order to maximize profitability in the cryptocurrency and traditional asset markets.
To understand more about the security features on PrimeXBT that have protected its users, check out PrimeXBT’s Security page.
submitted by benebit to CryptocurrencyICO [link] [comments]

How To End The Cryptocurrency Exchange "Wild West" Without Crippling Innovation


In case you haven't noticed the consultation paper, staff notice, and report on Quadriga, regulators are now clamping down on Canadian cryptocurrency exchanges. The OSC and other regulatory bodies are still interested in industry feedback. They have not put forward any official regulation yet. Below are some ideas/insights and a proposed framework.



Many of you have limited time to read the full proposal, so here are the highlights:

Offline Multi-Signature

Effective standards to prevent both internal and external theft. Exchange operators are trained and certified, and have a legal responsibility to users.

Regular Transparent Audits

Provides visibility to Canadians that their funds are fully backed on the exchange, while protecting privacy and sensitive platform information.

Insurance Requirements

Establishment of basic insurance standards/strategy, to expand over time. Removing risk to exchange users of any hot wallet theft.


Background and Justifications


Cold Storage Custody/Management
After reviewing close to 100 cases, all thefts tend to break down into more or less the same set of problems:
• Funds stored online or in a smart contract,
• Access controlled by one person or one system,
• 51% attacks (rare),
• Funds sent to the wrong address (also rare), or
• Some combination of the above.
For the first two cases, practical solutions exist and are widely implemented on exchanges already. Offline multi-signature solutions are already industry standard. No cases studied found an external theft or exit scam involving an offline multi-signature wallet implementation. Security can be further improved through minimum numbers of signatories, background checks, providing autonomy and legal protections to each signatory, establishing best practices, and a training/certification program.
The last two transaction risks occur more rarely, and have never resulted in a loss affecting the actual users of the exchange. In all cases to date where operators made the mistake, they've been fully covered by the exchange platforms.
• 51% attacks generally only occur on blockchains with less security. The most prominent cases have been Bitcoin Gold and Ethereum Classic. The simple solution is to enforce deposit limits and block delays such that a 51% attack is not cost-effective.
• The risk of transactions to incorrect addresses can be eliminated by a simple test transaction policy on large transactions. By sending a small amount of funds prior to any large withdrawals/transfers as a standard practice, the accuracy of the wallet address can be validated.
The proposal covers all loss cases and goes beyond, while avoiding significant additional costs, risks, and limitations which may be associated with other frameworks like SOC II.

On The Subject of Third Party Custodians
Many Canadian platforms are currently experimenting with third party custody. From the standpoint of the exchange operator, they can liberate themselves from some responsibility of custody, passing that off to someone else. For regulators, it puts crypto in similar categorization to oil, gold, and other commodities, with some common standards. Platform users would likely feel greater confidence if the custodian was a brand they recognized. If the custodian was knowledgeable and had a decent team that employed multi-sig, they could keep assets safe from internal theft. With the right protections in place, this could be a great solution for many exchanges, particularly those that lack the relevant experience or human resources for their own custody systems.
However, this system is vulnerable to anyone able to impersonate the exchange operators. You may have a situation where different employees who don't know each other that well are interacting between different companies (both the custodian and all their customers which presumably isn't just one exchange). A case study of what can go wrong in this type of environment might be Bitpay, where the CEO was tricked out of 5000 bitcoins over 3 separate payments by a series of emails sent legitimately from a breached computer of another company CEO. It's also still vulnerable to the platform being compromised, as in the really large $70M Bitfinex hack, where the third party Bitgo held one key in a multi-sig wallet. The hacker simply authorized the withdrawal using the same credentials as Bitfinex (requesting Bitgo to sign multiple withdrawal transactions). This succeeded even with the use of multi-sig and two heavily security-focused companies, due to the lack of human oversight (basically, hot wallet). Of course, you can learn from these cases and improve the security, but so can hackers improve their deception and at the end of the day, both of these would have been stopped by the much simpler solution of a qualified team who knew each other and employed multi-sig with properly protected keys. It's pretty hard to beat a human being who knows the business and the typical customer behaviour (or even knows their customers personally) at spotting fraud, and the proposed multi-sig means any hacker has to get through the scrutiny of 3 (or more) separate people, all of whom would have proper training including historical case studies.
There are strong arguments both for and against using use of third party custodians. The proposal sets mandatory minimum custody standards would apply regardless if the cold wallet signatories are exchange operators, independent custodians, or a mix of both.

On The Subject Of Insurance
ShakePay has taken the first steps into this new realm (congratulations). There is no question that crypto users could be better protected by the right insurance policies, and it certainly feels better to transact with insured platforms. The steps required to obtain insurance generally place attention in valuable security areas, and in this case included a review from CipherTrace. One of the key solutions in traditional finance comes from insurance from entities such as the CDIC.
However, historically, there wasn't found any actual insurance payout to any cryptocurrency exchange, and there are notable cases where insurance has not paid. With Bitpay, for example, the insurance agent refused because the issue happened to the third party CEO's computer instead of anything to do with Bitpay itself. With the Youbit exchange in South Korea, their insurance claim was denied, and the exchange ultimately ended up instead going bankrupt with all user's funds lost. To quote Matt Johnson in the original Lloyd's article: “You can create an insurance policy that protects no one – you know there are so many caveats to the policy that it’s not super protective.”
ShakePay's insurance was only reported to cover their cold storage, and “physical theft of the media where the private keys are held”. Physical theft has never, in the history of cryptocurrency exchange cases reviewed, been reported as the cause of loss. From the limited information of the article, ShakePay made it clear their funds are in the hands of a single US custodian, and at least part of their security strategy is to "decline[] to confirm the custodian’s name on the record". While this prevents scrutiny of the custodian, it's pretty silly to speculate that a reasonably competent hacking group couldn't determine who the custodian is. A far more common infiltration strategy historically would be social engineering, which has succeeded repeatedly. A hacker could trick their way into ShakePay's systems and request a fraudulent withdrawal, impersonate ShakePay and request the custodian to move funds, or socially engineer their way into the custodian to initiate the withdrawal of multiple accounts (a payout much larger than ShakePay) exploiting the standard procedures (for example, fraudulently initiating or override the wallet addresses of a real transfer). In each case, nothing was physically stolen and the loss is therefore not covered by insurance.
In order for any insurance to be effective, clear policies have to be established about what needs to be covered. Anything short of that gives Canadians false confidence that they are protected when they aren't in any meaningful way. At this time, the third party insurance market does not appear to provide adequate options or coverage, and effort is necessary to standardize custody standards, which is a likely first step in ultimately setting up an insurance framework.
A better solution compared to third party insurance providers might be for Canadian exchange operators to create their own collective insurance fund, or a specific federal organization similar to the CDIC. Such an organization would have a greater interest or obligation in paying out actual cases, and that would be it's purpose rather than maximizing it's own profit. This would be similar to the SAFU which Binance has launched, except it would cover multiple exchanges. There is little question whether the SAFU would pay out given a breach of Binance, and a similar argument could be made for a insurance fund managed by a collective of exchange operators or a government organization. While a third party insurance provider has the strong market incentive to provide the absolute minimum coverage and no market incentive to payout, an entity managed by exchange operators would have incentive to protect the reputation of exchange operators/the industry, and the government should have the interest of protecting Canadians.

On The Subject of Fractional Reserve
There is a long history of fractional reserve failures, from the first banks in ancient times, through the great depression (where hundreds of fractional reserve banks failed), right through to the 2008 banking collapse referenced in the first bitcoin block. The fractional reserve system allows banks to multiply the money supply far beyond the actual cash (or other assets) in existence, backed only by a system of debt obligations of others. Safely supporting a fractional reserve system is a topic of far greater complexity than can be addressed by a simple policy, and when it comes to cryptocurrency, there is presently no entity reasonably able to bail anyone out in the event of failure. Therefore, this framework is addressed around entities that aim to maintain 100% backing of funds.
There may be some firms that desire but have failed to maintain 100% backing. In this case, there are multiple solutions, including outside investment, merging with other exchanges, or enforcing a gradual restoration plan. All of these solutions are typically far better than shutting down the exchange, and there are multiple cases where they've been used successfully in the past.

Proof of Reserves/Transparency/Accountability
Canadians need to have visibility into the backing on an ongoing basis.
The best solution for crypto-assets is a Proof of Reserve. Such ideas go back all the way to 2013, before even Mt. Gox. However, no Canadian exchange has yet implemented such a system, and only a few international exchanges (CoinFloor in the UK being an example) have. Many firms like Kraken, BitBuy, and now ShakePay use the Proof of Reserve term to refer to lesser proofs which do not actually cryptographically prove the full backing of all user assets on the blockchain. In order for a Proof of Reserve to be effective, it must actually be a complete proof, and it needs to be understood by the public that is expected to use it. Many firms have expressed reservations about the level of transparency required in a complete Proof of Reserve (for example Kraken here). While a complete Proof of Reserves should be encouraged, and there are some solutions in the works (ie TxQuick), this is unlikely to be suitable universally for all exchange operators and users.
Given the limitations, and that firms also manage fiat assets, a more traditional audit process makes more sense. Some Canadian exchanges (CoinSquare, CoinBerry) have already subjected themselves to annual audits. However, these results are not presently shared publicly, and there is no guarantee over the process including all user assets or the integrity and independence of the auditor. The auditor has been typically not known, and in some cases, the identity of the auditor is protected by a NDA. Only in one case (BitBuy) was an actual report generated and publicly shared. There has been no attempt made to validate that user accounts provided during these audits have been complete or accurate. A fraudulent fractional exchange, or one which had suffered a breach they were unwilling to publicly accept (see CoinBene), could easily maintain a second set of books for auditors or simply exclude key accounts to pass an individual audit.
The proposed solution would see a reporting standard which includes at a minimum - percentage of backing for each asset relative to account balances and the nature of how those assets are stored, with ownership proven by the auditor. The auditor would also publicly provide a "hash list", which they independently generate from the accounts provided by the exchange. Every exchange user can then check their information against this public "hash list". A hash is a one-way form of encryption, which fully protects the private information, yet allows anyone who knows that information already to validate that it was included. Less experienced users can take advantage of public tools to calculate the hash from their information (provided by the exchange), and thus have certainty that the auditor received their full balance information. Easy instructions can be provided.
Auditors should be impartial, their identities and process public, and they should be rotated so that the same auditor is never used twice in a row. Balancing the cost of auditing against the needs for regular updates, a 6 month cycle likely makes the most sense.

Hot Wallet Management
The best solution for hot wallets is not to use them. CoinBerry reportedly uses multi-sig on all withdrawals, and Bitmex is an international example known for their structure devoid of hot wallets.
However, many platforms and customers desire fast withdrawal processes, and human validation has a cost of time and delay in this process.
A model of self-insurance or separate funds for hot wallets may be used in these cases. Under this model, a platform still has 100% of their client balance in cold storage and holds additional funds in hot wallets for quick withdrawal. Thus, the risk of those hot wallets is 100% on exchange operators and not affecting the exchange users. Since most platforms typically only have 1%-5% in hot wallets at any given time, it shouldn't be unreasonable to build/maintain these additional reserves over time using exchange fees or additional investment. Larger withdrawals would still be handled at regular intervals from the cold storage.
Hot wallet risks have historically posed a large risk and there is no established standard to guarantee secure hot wallets. When the government of South Korea dispatched security inspections to multiple exchanges, the results were still that 3 of them got hacked after the inspections. If standards develop such that an organization in the market is willing to insure the hot wallets, this could provide an acceptable alternative. Another option may be for multiple exchange operators to pool funds aside for a hot wallet insurance fund. Comprehensive coverage standards must be established and maintained for all hot wallet balances to make sure Canadians are adequately protected.

Current Draft Proposal

(1) Proper multi-signature cold wallet storage.
(a) Each private key is the personal and legal responsibility of one person - the “signatory”. Signatories have special rights and responsibilities to protect user assets. Signatories are trained and certified through a course covering (1) past hacking and fraud cases, (2) proper and secure key generation, and (3) proper safekeeping of private keys. All private keys must be generated and stored 100% offline by the signatory. If even one private keys is ever breached or suspected to be breached, the wallet must be regenerated and all funds relocated to a new wallet.
(b) All signatories must be separate background-checked individuals free of past criminal conviction. Canadians should have a right to know who holds their funds. All signing of transactions must take place with all signatories on Canadian soil or on the soil of a country with a solid legal system which agrees to uphold and support these rules (from an established white-list of countries which expands over time).
(c) 3-5 independent signatures are required for any withdrawal. There must be 1-3 spare signatories, and a maximum of 7 total signatories. The following are all valid combinations: 3of4, 3of5, 3of6, 4of5, 4of6, 4of7, 5of6, or 5of7.
(d) A security audit should be conducted to validate the cold wallet is set up correctly and provide any additional pertinent information. The primary purpose is to ensure that all signatories are acting independently and using best practices for private key storage. A report summarizing all steps taken and who did the audit will be made public. Canadians must be able to validate the right measures are in place to protect their funds.
(e) There is a simple approval process if signatories wish to visit any country outside Canada, with a potential whitelist of exempt countries. At most 2 signatories can be outside of aligned jurisdiction at any given time. All exchanges would be required to keep a compliant cold wallet for Canadian funds and have a Canadian office if they wish to serve Canadian customers.
(2) Regular and transparent solvency audits.
(a) An audit must be conducted at founding, after 3 months of operation, and at least once every 6 months to compare customer balances against all stored cryptocurrency and fiat balances. The auditor must be known, independent, and never the same twice in a row.
(b) An audit report will be published featuring the steps conducted in a readable format. This should be made available to all Canadians on the exchange website and on a government website. The report must include what percentage of each customer asset is backed on the exchange, and how those funds are stored.
(c) The auditor will independently produce a hash of each customer's identifying information and balance as they perform the audit. This will be made publicly available on the exchange and government website, along with simplified instructions that each customer can use to verify that their balance was included in the audit process.
(d) The audit needs to include a proof of ownership for any cryptocurrency wallets included. A satoshi test (spending a small amount) or partially signed transaction both qualify.
(e) Any platform without 100% reserves should be assessed on a regular basis by a government or industry watchdog. This entity should work to prevent any further drop, support any private investor to come in, or facilitate a merger so that 100% backing can be obtained as soon as possible.
(3) Protections for hot wallets and transactions.
(a) A standardized list of approved coins and procedures will be established to constitute valid cold storage wallets. Where a multi-sig process is not natively available, efforts will be undertaken to establish a suitable and stable smart contract standard. This list will be expanded and improved over time. Coins and procedures not on the list are considered hot wallets.
(b) Hot wallets can be backed by additional funds in cold storage or an acceptable third-party insurance provider with a comprehensive coverage policy.
(c) Exchanges are required to cover the full balance of all user funds as denominated in the same currency, or double the balance as denominated in bitcoin or CAD using an established trading rate. If the balance is ever insufficient due to market movements, the firm must rectify this within 24 hours by moving assets to cold storage or increasing insurance coverage.
(d) Any large transactions (above a set threshold) from cold storage to any new wallet addresses (not previously transacted with) must be tested with a smaller transaction first. Deposits of cryptocurrency must be limited to prevent economic 51% attacks. Any issues are to be covered by the exchange.
(e) Exchange platforms must provide suitable authentication for users, including making available approved forms of two-factor authentication. SMS-based authentication is not to be supported. Withdrawals must be blocked for 48 hours in the event of any account password change. Disputes on the negligence of exchanges should be governed by case law.

Steps Forward

Continued review of existing OSC feedback is still underway. More feedback and opinions on the framework and ideas as presented here are extremely valuable. The above is a draft and not finalized.
The process of further developing and bringing a suitable framework to protect Canadians will require the support of exchange operators, legal experts, and many others in the community. The costs of not doing such are tremendous. A large and convoluted framework, one based on flawed ideas or implementation, or one which fails to properly safeguard Canadians is not just extremely expensive and risky for all Canadians, severely limiting to the credibility and reputation of the industry, but an existential risk to many exchanges.
The responsibility falls to all of us to provide our insight and make our opinions heard on this critical matter. Please take the time to give your thoughts.
submitted by azoundria2 to QuadrigaInitiative [link] [comments]

Centralized exchanges and their risks

Centralized exchanges and their risks
The ecosystem of 2Ether will include a decentralized exchange, 2EtherEx. How are decentralized exchanges – DEX – different from traditional centralized exchanges? Are they really better? What issues do they face? We'll tell you all about it a series of posts. This time, we'll look at centralized exchanges – why they have nothing to do with real decentralization and what risks they pose.
Big exchanges like Coinbase and Huobi allow you to trade in decentralized crypto assets, but they themselves are completely centralized. This is for three reasons:
1) All transactions are processed off-chain and recorded in the exchange's own database. All those thousands of trades made every day on Coinbase, for example, are never recorded on the blockchain.
2) Client funds are stored in a centralized way. When you deposit money on an exchange, it goes into the main wallet of the exchange. It's huge – there are millions of dollars' worth of crypto there. If you send money from your blockchain wallet, then this – and only this – operation is recorded on the blockchain. After this, the centralized exchange assigns you credit of sorts – it puts as much crypto on your individual account as you put in the main wallet. At the end of trading, when you want to withdraw your profits, you sort of exchange those credits for the real crypto, which gets sent to your wallet. This transaction is also recorded on the blockchain. But everything in between has nothing to do with decentralization.
3) The exchange management is centralized – it's in the hands of a few people. They can become very powerful, and their decisions influence what happens to your funds. For example, Changpeng Zhao, the CEO of Binance, has such weight in the industry that he doesn't even comment on the potential of any coins. On the other hand, illegal actions taken by exchange executives can have terrible consequences. When the CEO of the Canadian exchange Quadriga was found dead in India, it turned out that almost $100 million were missing from the accounts. This money will probably never be found.
Centralization of exchanges has several more risks:
- Easy target for hackers. We've all heard about massive thefts from exchanges – sometimes up to $500 million. Since all the funds are stored together, exchanges' wallets are among the most attractive things to hack, so criminals keep trying.
- Market manipulations. Exchanges and their partners do lots of wash trading, fictitious deals, front-running, etc. It's estimated that over 80% of all Bitcoin trading volume is essentially fake. Exchanges want to be in the top-10 by volume – and most of their revenue comes from commissions. So they will allow bots and many dubious practices, even if their Terms of Use usually say that you can't manipulate the market in any way.
- Arbitrary actions. An exchange can suddenly close operations in a certain country, introduce an obligatory KYC, or delist an asset.
So if centralized exchanges are so risky, why do most traders use them? The reason is that they have some very serious advantages, too. We'll look at those advantages in our next post.
https://2ether.com/
Web site — https://2ether.com/ Twitter — https://twitter.com/2Ether_ Discord — https://discord.gg/TuqG4py Facebook — https://www.facebook.com/2Ethe Reddit — https://www.reddit.com/use2Ether Medium — https://medium.com/@2ether Teletype — https://teletype.in/@2ether Telegram — https://t.me/ether2support Telegram chat — https://t.me/blockchain_2ether
submitted by 2Ether to u/2Ether [link] [comments]

Q2 - 2019 | Cryptocurrency Anti-Money Laundering Report Highlights:

  1. Thieves and scammers stole more than $4.26 billion from cryptocurrency exchanges, investors, and users in the first half of 2019.
  2. Users and investors lost approximately US$2.9 billion as “South Korean” Plus Token app and exchange went offline; Chinese police arrested six Chinese nationals in Vanuatu as the alleged perpetrators.
  3. Hackers used advanced cyberattack to steal $44 million from world’s largest cryptocurrency exchange, Binance.
  4. Update from Canadian court on QuadrigaCX collapse reveals long history of misappropriation of user funds by QuadrigaCX founder.
  5. Japanese exchange BITPoint hacked for $30 million.
  6. BestMixer mixing service seized by law enforcement authorities.
  7. European authorities seized three dark web markets and assets.
  8. CFTC charged Control-Finance in $147M Ponzi scheme.
  9. Facebook shook up crypto economy and woke up policy makers with Libra announcement.
  10. SIM Swapping victim won $75.8 million judgement against hacker.
  11. More sophisticated exchange hacks used advanced simultaneous takeovers of user and admin accounts.
  12. SEC sued Kik over $100 million unregistered ICO.
  13. CipherTrace research shows Bitcoin still dominates payment method in dark markets despite advent of privacy coins.
  14. Hack may have caused Bitcoin flash crash on Kraken.
  15. European authorities made arrests in two major typosquatting scams that cost exchange users tens of millions.
  16. $23 million in Bitcoin lost and co-owner found dead after Polish exchange Bitmarket shutters due to “liquidity issues.
  17. Iran accused US of attempting to block its virgin Bitcoin as means to compensate for financial hit from sanctions.
  18. UN published report on North Korean government hackers stealing $571 million from Asian exchanges to fund WMD and compensate for sanctions.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Full Report: Webpage or PDF
submitted by 2Panik to Buttcoin [link] [comments]

Q2 - 2019 | Cryptocurrency Anti-Money Laundering Report Highlights:

  1. Thieves and scammers stole more than $4.26 billion from cryptocurrency exchanges, investors, and users in the first half of 2019.
  2. Users and investors lost approximately US$2.9 billion as “South Korean” Plus Token app and exchange went offline; Chinese police arrested six Chinese nationals in Vanuatu as the alleged perpetrators.
  3. Hackers used advanced cyberattack to steal $44 million from world’s largest cryptocurrency exchange, Binance.
  4. Update from Canadian court on QuadrigaCX collapse reveals long history of misappropriation of user funds by QuadrigaCX founder.
  5. Japanese exchange BITPoint hacked for $30 million.
  6. BestMixer mixing service seized by law enforcement authorities.
  7. European authorities seized three dark web markets and assets.
  8. CFTC charged Control-Finance in $147M Ponzi scheme.
  9. Facebook shook up crypto economy and woke up policy makers with Libra announcement.
  10. SIM Swapping victim won $75.8 million judgement against hacker.
  11. More sophisticated exchange hacks used advanced simultaneous takeovers of user and admin accounts.
  12. SEC sued Kik over $100 million unregistered ICO.
  13. CipherTrace research shows Bitcoin still dominates payment method in dark markets despite advent of privacy coins.
  14. Hack may have caused Bitcoin flash crash on Kraken.
  15. European authorities made arrests in two major typosquatting scams that cost exchange users tens of millions.
  16. $23 million in Bitcoin lost and co-owner found dead after Polish exchange Bitmarket shutters due to “liquidity issues.
  17. Iran accused US of attempting to block its virgin Bitcoin as means to compensate for financial hit from sanctions.
  18. UN published report on North Korean government hackers stealing $571 million from Asian exchanges to fund WMD and compensate for sanctions.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Full Report: Webpage or PDF
submitted by 2Panik to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Q2 - 2019 | Cryptocurrency Anti-Money Laundering Report Highlights:

  1. Thieves and scammers stole more than $4.26 billion from cryptocurrency exchanges, investors, and users in the first half of 2019.
  2. Users and investors lost approximately US$2.9 billion as “South Korean” Plus Token app and exchange went offline; Chinese police arrested six Chinese nationals in Vanuatu as the alleged perpetrators.
  3. Hackers used advanced cyberattack to steal $44 million from world’s largest cryptocurrency exchange, Binance.
  4. Update from Canadian court on QuadrigaCX collapse reveals long history of misappropriation of user funds by QuadrigaCX founder.
  5. Japanese exchange BITPoint hacked for $30 million.
  6. BestMixer mixing service seized by law enforcement authorities.
  7. European authorities seized three dark web markets and assets.
  8. CFTC charged Control-Finance in $147M Ponzi scheme.
  9. Facebook shook up crypto economy and woke up policy makers with Libra announcement.
  10. SIM Swapping victim won $75.8 million judgement against hacker.
  11. More sophisticated exchange hacks used advanced simultaneous takeovers of user and admin accounts.
  12. SEC sued Kik over $100 million unregistered ICO.
  13. CipherTrace research shows Bitcoin still dominates payment method in dark markets despite advent of privacy coins.
  14. Hack may have caused Bitcoin flash crash on Kraken.
  15. European authorities made arrests in two major typosquatting scams that cost exchange users tens of millions.
  16. $23 million in Bitcoin lost and co-owner found dead after Polish exchange Bitmarket shutters due to “liquidity issues.
  17. Iran accused US of attempting to block its virgin Bitcoin as means to compensate for financial hit from sanctions.
  18. UN published report on North Korean government hackers stealing $571 million from Asian exchanges to fund WMD and compensate for sanctions.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Full Report: Webpage or PDF
submitted by 2Panik to CryptoCurrency [link] [comments]

Payments Startup Uphold to Use Ledger Vault

Payments Startup Uphold to Use Ledger Vault
https://preview.redd.it/31n208r4i4y21.jpg?width=1024&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=ddedc6a6f95c5699a5de15c28d7f46dada6968a0
French crypto hardware firm Ledger will provide its technology to American payments startup Uphold to improve security, according to a press release shared with Cointelegraph on May 13.
Formerly known) as Bitreserve, Uphold will reportedly incorporate Ledger’s institutional custody platform Ledger Vault to boost its anti-hack protection by adding an additional layer of security.
J. P. Thieriot, co-founder and CEO of Uphold, said that Ledger Vault integration was mainly driven by customer demand for thorough security measures.
According to the press release, the integration of Ledger’s tech will enable a number of key benefits for Uphold, including a multi-authorization governance model, support of new ERC-20stablecoins and other proxy assets such as the Universal Protocol-based tokens, among the others.
Ledger Vault first rolled out in May 2018 as a digital asset security tool targeting institutional investors. The firm subsequently announced that it was expanding its business to New York in November 2018, also appointing a former Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) executive as head of global operations.
Recently, Ledger announced that Canadian crypto exchange National Digital Asset Exchange (NDAX) would use Ledger Vault to secure its assets.
Yesterday, major crypto exchange Binance announced that the platform was planning to fully resume deposits and withdrawals, following a major hack that resulted in the loss of $40 million worth of bitcoin (BTC).
submitted by Rajladumor1 to omgfin [link] [comments]

Cryptocurrencies continue to slide with Bloomberg Digital Assets 10 Index now down 80% YTD, surpassing the Nasdaq Composite’s drop during dot-com bubble in CY2000

Sources:
https://www.ccn.com/decentralized-crypto-trading-platform-airswap-strikes-deal-to-tokenize-ny-real-estate-market/ https://www.newsbtc.com/2018/09/12/alive-play-casino-offers-vr-online-gambling-experience-on-blockchain-launches-exclusive-private-sale/ https://www.ccn.com/australian-blockchain-delegation-heads-to-china-to-foster-fintech-ties/ https://www.coindesk.com/major-crypto-companies-form-dc-lobbying-group/ https://bitcoinist.com/winklevoss-gemini-dollar-charlie-shrem/ https://cointelegraph.com/news/two-us-states-implore-indian-authorities-to-seize-property-of-bitconnect-promoters https://www.ccn.com/this-canadian-town-is-coughing-up-bitcoin-after-ransomware-attack/ https://www.coindesk.com/inside-bitewei-the-20-million-bitcoin-miner-being-hailed-as-a-bitmain-rival/ https://news.bitcoin.com/chinese-report-finds-9-in-10-altcoins-stolen-80-code/?utm_source=OneSignal%20Push&utm_medium=notification&utm_campaign=Push%20Notifications https://cointelegraph.com/news/crypto-industry-leaders-establish-washington-based-lobby-group https://www.coindesk.com/softbank-completes-blockchain-poc-for-cross-carrier-mobile-payments/ https://www.ccn.com/binance-partners-malta-stock-exchange-to-launch-new-digital-exchange/ https://www.ccn.com/this-canadian-town-is-coughing-up-bitcoin-after-ransomware-attack/ https://bitcoinist.com/winklevoss-gemini-dollar-charlie-shrem/ https://news.bitcoin.com/chinese-report-finds-9-in-10-altcoins-stolen-80-code/ https://www.newsbtc.com/2018/09/12/alive-play-casino-offers-vr-online-gambling-experience-on-blockchain-launches-exclusive-private-sale/
submitted by QuantalyticsResearch to CryptoCurrency [link] [comments]

Crypto News Recap for the week ending August 3rd

Developments in Financial Services

Regulatory

General News

submitted by QuantalyticsResearch to CryptoCurrency [link] [comments]

Binance Hack: Bitcoin im Wert von 42 Mio. USD gestohlen ❌ Bitcoin Q&A: Binance hack, chain roll-back? Binance Loan Hack by ScriptLord for 10000 usdt bitcoin ... Is Your Crypto at Risk? Binance $40,000,000 Bitcoin HACK! 2020: EXACTLY How to buy Bitcoin or ANY CRYPTOCURRENCY in ... Binance Has Been Hacked Details zum 40 Millionen USD Binance Hack & kann man Bitcoin “backrollen”? Binance Hack, Canadian Cannabis, & IRS Tracks Fraudsters - Bitcoin & Cryptocurrency News

Japan-based Bitcoin exchange Mt. Gox had been operating since 2010 and was the biggest Bitcoin exchange at the time. But very few know that this big exchange was not hacked only once, but twice. The first one happened in June 2011 when the hacker was able to get ahold of Mt.Gox’s auditor’s credentials and transferred 2609 bitcoins to an address for which Mt. Gox had no keys. Binance provides easy and convenient ways for you to buy Bitcoin instantly, and we put our best efforts to fully inform our users about each and every cryptocurrency we offer on the exchange, but we are not responsible for the results that may arise from your Bitcoin purchase. This page and any information in it is not meant to be interpreted as an endorsement of any particular cryptocurrency ... Bitcoin Canadian Organisation Paid C$20,000 worth of Bitcoin to Anonymous Hacker. Margi Brambhatt Send an email October 27, 2018. 1 minute read. Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Reddit Skype WhatsApp Telegram Viber Share via Email. According to Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), an organization representing native tribes of Canada, recently paid ransomware in bitcoin worth CAD 20,000 to regain ... While it is still unclear as to how exactly the hacker(s) gained access to user funds ... Binance – 7,000 BTC. Despite the fact that we are now in 2019, hackers still managed to use a phishing scam and malware to hack into Binance. The malicious actors ran off with $40 million worth of Bitcoin. As a result, Binance promised to increase its security, but users are understandably wary. It ... Another crypto exchange was allegedly hacked or more probably exit-scammed today – this time it was a small and relatively unknown Canadian exchange MapleChange. The social media channels of the exchange swiftly proclaimed lack of funds to pay out their users and shutting down of all social media profiles. The exchange claims there was a […] To date, it has only succumbed to one attack, losing US$40 million worth of cyptocurrency to a hacker in May 2019. Following the attack, it replaced all lost user funds with its own reserves. Overall, Binance has a reputation for being a very communicative cryptocurrency exchange compared to other similar-sized platforms. Binance offers a substantial number of coins, which are traded mostly against Bitcoin and Ethereum. On the other side the two major coins are also paird with USDT (US Dollar Tether a digital asset, backed by US dollars, which aims to keep a 1:1 price ratio). The list of coins available at Bitnancie includes, but is not limited to (especially since new ones are added frequently): BTC, ETH, LTC ... Canadian Bitcoin Scams Increasing As Hackers Use Spear-Phishing Strategy. Bitcoin News Crypto Scams. By John Wanguba On Jun 26, 2020. 2. Share. The police department in Burnaby has discovered that there is a surge in Bitcoin scams across Vancouver. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, or RCMP, cover Burnaby which is a district within British Columbia. Law enforcers noted a constant increase in ... The decentralized exchange (dex) built on Ethereum, Uniswap has accumulated a whopping $2 billion in total value locked (TVL) this week. Tuesday’s data shows out of all the dece Binance customer service is online 24/7 to help with your needs. FAQ. Got a question? We've probably got the answer for you here. View More » Submit a request. Can't find the solution to your problem? Contact the Binance Customer Support team. Contact Binance Support » Beginners' Guide. Learn how to get started using Binance with our simple guides! View More » Download the Binance App ...

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Binance Hack: Bitcoin im Wert von 42 Mio. USD gestohlen ❌

This is how to hack crypto specifically binance through binance loan with the help of hack script developed by ScriptLord which hacks binance collateral syst... Binance Has Been Hacked Jumping on live to discuss what is going on with the Binance Bitcoin Hack! #Binance #Bitcoin #Hack. Firstly, thanks for watching I appreciate your support! Binance today was hacked for 7,000 Bitcoin, while markets are remaining resilient, what does this mean for you and your Bitcoin? Sources https://www.theblock... Bitcoin and cryptocurrency news - Syscoin blockchain compromised, Binance APIs hacked, IRS forming the ultimte boy band, Ugandan government cracks down on social media, Marijuana is the new ... Shakepay Link: https://shakepay.me/r/Z3AUZHI Note the Shakepay funding address has changed! It's now [email protected] Binance Link: https://www.binance.co... Binance considered rolling back the Bitcoin chain in order to recover stolen funds. How would that have happened? How likely is it that such a recovery method would be executed in the future? In dem Video sprechen wir über den aktuellen Binance Hack bei dem über 7.000 BTC gestohlen wurden. Binance: https://www.binance.com/de/register?ref=10975229 ... In meinen Videos geht es um Bitcoin, Ethereum, Blockchain und Kryptowährungen generell, um Scam, Abzocke und Betrug besonders im Mining keinen Platz zu geben. Ich spreche darüber, wie du schlau ...

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